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TO HEAL ANOTHER OR TO PROTECT
ONESELF?: HIV UNDER THE ADA IN LIGHT OF
BRAGDON v. ABBO7T
I. INTRODUCTION
During a routine dental appointment, petitioner, Dr. Bragdon,
informed respondent, Ms. Sidney Abbott, that she had a cavity
which could only be filled in a hospital setting.' Petitioner
maintained an infectious disease policy, which respondent
claimed violated the Americans with Disabilities Act [hereinafter
"ADA"]. 2 The United States District Court ruled in favor of
respondent and the Court of Appeals affirmed? Petitioner
appealed to the Supreme Court which affirmed in part and
remanded in part for further proceedings. 4
In order to state a claim under the ADA,5 respondent needed to
show that she had a "physical or mental impairment that
substantially limit(ed) one or more of the major life
activities .... ,6 Once this was shown, it was possible under the
ADA for her to be assured of antidiscrimination 7 in her request
Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2201 (1998).
Id. See also 42 U.S.C. § § 12101-12213 (1994)"
3 Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580 (D. Maine 1995); see also Abbott v.
Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934 (1st Cir. 1997).
4 Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
-'42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.
6 Id. at § 12102(2). Section 12102(2) provides in pertinent part: "The term
'disability' means, with respect to the individual -(A) a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of
such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as
having such an impairment." Id. Ms. Abbott stated her claim under part (A)
of this provision. Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2201.
7 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994). Section 12182(a) provides in pertinent part:
"No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the
full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any
person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public
accommodation." Id.
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for services8 However, the discrimination would be allowed if
petitioner could prove that a "significant risk to the health or
safety of others [could not] be eliminated by reasonable
accommodation."9
Respondent claimed that her human immunodeficiency virus
[hereinafter "HIV"] positive status constituted a physical
impairment under the ADA, 0 and that this status substantially
limited the major life activity of procreation. 1 The first prong of
her three-pronged claim, that her HIV positive status constituted a
disability for the purposes of stating a claim under the ADA,
required her to prove that asymptomatic HIV was considered a
"disability." 12 The second prong, that reproduction is a "major
life activity," 1 3 has had differing results in the Circuit Courts of
the United States. 14 The third prong ties the first two together
when the physical impairment substantially limits a major life
activity.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve three issues: 1)
whether reproduction is a major life activity within the meaning
of the ADA, 5 2) whether asymptomatic individuals infected with
HIV are per se disabled within the meaning of the ADA, 6 and 3)
whether courts should defer to the professional judgment of a
8 Id. at § 12181(7). Section 12181(7) provides in pertinent part: "The
following private entities are considered public accommodations for purposes
of this subchapter, if the operations of such entities affect commerce -- (F)...
professional office of a health care provider ... ." Id.
9 Id. at § 12111(3). Section 12111(3) provides in pertinent part: "The term
'direct threat' means a significant risk to the health or safety of others that
cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation." Id.
10 Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2201 (1998).
11 Id. at 2204.
12 See supra note 6.
1' See infra note 32.
14 See Pacourek v. Inland Steel, 916 F. Supp. 797 (E.D. Ill. 1996) (finding
that reproduction was a major life activity); Erickson v. Board of Governers,
911 F. Supp. 316 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (finding that reproduction was a major life
activity). But see Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc., 881 F. Supp 240 (E.D.
La. 1995), aff'd, 79 F.3d. 1143 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that reproduction was
not a major life activity).
15 Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2205.
16 Id. at 2201.
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private health care provider and current medical knowledge when
deciding whether an invasive procedure must be performed on an
infected patient in the provider's office. 7
II. LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY
A. Legislative History
The ADA1 8 was preceded by the Rehabilitation Act [hereinafter
"Act"] of 1973.9 Both pieces of legislation address the issue of
disabilities in the workplace. While the Act was intended to
increase vocational opportunities for disabled Americans' O, the
ADA was enacted to "provide a clear and comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals
with disabilities." 2'
The passage of the Rehabilitation Act in 1973 "prohibit[ed] a
federally funded state program from discriminating against a
handicapped individual solely by reason of his or her handicap." -
,7 Id. at 2210-11.
18 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
19 29 U.S.C. § 701(c) (1994). Section 701(c) provides in pertinent part:
It is the policy of the United States that all programs,
projects, and activities receiving assistance under this chapter
shall be carried out in a manner consistent with the principles
of-(1) respect for individual dignity, personal responsibility,
self-determination, and pursuit of meaningful careers, based
on informed choice, of individuals with disabilities; (2)
respect for the privacy rights, and equal access (including the
use of accessible formats), of the individuals; (3) inclusion,
integration, and full participation of the individuals; (4)
support for the involvement of a parent, a family member, a
guardian, an advocate, or authorized representative if an
individual with a disability requests, desires or needs such
support: and (5) support for individual and systemic
advocacy and community involvement.
Id.
20 See infra note 21.
21 Katz v. City Metal Co., Inc., 87 F.3d 26, 30 (1stCir. 1996).
22 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1994). See also School Board of Nassau County v.
Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 275 (1986).
1999
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Although this legislation was primarily focused on increasing
vocational opportunities for handicapped individuals,2' it
included an antidiscrimination provision modeled after the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. 2 This provision prohibited discrimination
solely on the basis of the individual's handicap.25 Additionally,
Senator Hubert Humphrey stated in 1977 that this Act enlisted all
programs receiving federal funds in the effort "to share with
handicapped Americans the opportunities for an education,
transportation, housing, health care, and jobs that other
Americans take for granted.
26
The definition of "disability" in the Act centered around an
individual's ability to work.27 However, this proved to be too
2 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1994). Section 701 provides in pertinent part:
The purposes of this chapter are-(1) to empower individuals
with disabilities to maximize employment, economic self-
sufficiency, independence, and inclusion and integration into
society ... (2) to ensure that the Federal Government plays
a leadership role in promoting the employment of individuals
with disabilities, especially individuals with significant
disabilities, and in assisting States and providers of services
in fulfilling the aspirations of such individuals with
disabilities for meaningful and gainful employment and
independent living.
Id.
24 Arline, 480 U.S. at 277-78.
25 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994). Section 794(a) provides in pertinent part:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the
Unites States, as defined in section 706(20) [FN1] of this
title, shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program
or activity conducted by an Executive agency or by the
United States Postal Service.
Id.
26 123 CONG. REc. 13515 (1977) (statement of Sen. Humphrey) cited in
Arline, 480 U.S at 277.
27 29 U.S.C. § 705(20) (1994). Section 705(20) provides in pertinent part:
Individual with a disability (A) In general-Except as
otherwise provided in subparagraph (B), the term "individual
with a disability" means any individual who-(i) has a
physical or mental impairment which for such individual
[Vol 15808
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narrow a definition to address discrimination in the other areas
addressed in the legislation, 28 like housing, education and health
care.29 Consequently, in 1974, Congress expanded the definition
of "handicapped individual" in an attempt to ameliorate this
problem.30 Regulations promulgated by the Department of Health
and Human Services [hereinafter "DI-IHS"] further define such
terms as "physical impairment"3" and "major life activity.
Yet, the scope of this legislation continued to target federally
funded programs. 33  Therefore, individuals and programs not
receiving federal assistance were not necessarily prohibited from
discriminating against individuals on the basis of their handicap.
In 1990, Congress passed the ADA.- Where the Rehabilitation
Act focused on vocational rehabilitation with an
antidiscriminatory provision,35 the ADA was enacted to "provide
a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
constitutes or results in a substantial impediment to
employment; and (ii) can benefit in terms of an employment
outcome from vocational rehabilitation services ....
Id.
2 Arline, 480 U.S. at 279. Since the Act specified "any program or activity
receiving Federal assistance," the Act, by it's own language, did not preclude
discrimination that does not receive any federal assistance.29Id.
30 Id. at 278-79. See also 29 U.S.C.A. § 705(20)(B). Section 705(20)(B)
provides in pertinent part: "[A]ny person who (i) has a physical or mental
impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life
activities; (ii) has a record of such an impairment; or (iii) is regarded as having
such an impairment." Id.
31 45 C.F.R. § 84.30)(2)(i) (1998). This section provides in pertinent part:
"[P]hysical or mental impairment' means (A) any physiological disorder or
condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of
the following body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense
organs; respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive;
digestive; genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine. .... " Id.
32 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii). This section provides in pertinent part:
"'[M]ajor life activities' means functions such as functions such as caring for
one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning, and working." Id.
11 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
34 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213 (1994).
31 School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 277 (1987).
1999
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discrimination against individuals with disabilities., 3 6 The ADA
utilized the term "disability" instead of "handicap"; nevertheless,
it was the intent of Congress to simply remain current with the
statute's language, rather than create a new definition. 3' Another
distinction between the Act and the ADA relates to whom the
statutes apply. Where the Rehabilitation Act applies to federally
funded state programs,38 the ADA provides broader coverage.39
The ADAs coverage ensures equal access to those with
disabilities in places of "public accommodation." 40  This is
particularly important in tracing the case law leading up to the
Supreme Court decision in Bragdon v. Abbott.41 The importance
36 42 U.S.C. § 12101. See also Katz v. City Metal Co., Inc., 87 F.3d 26,
30 (1st Cir. 1996).
37 Erickson v. Board of Governors, 911 F. Supp. 316, 322 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
38 29 U.S.C. § 701(c) (1994). Section 701(c) provides in pertinent part: "It
is the policy of the United States that all programs, projects, and activities
receiving assistance under this chapter shall be carried out in a manner
consistent with the principles . . . ." Id.
39 42 U.S.C. § 12101. Section 12101 provides in pertinent part:
It is the purpose of this chapter (1) to provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities; (2) to
provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards
addressing discrimination against individuals with
disabilities; (3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a
central role in enforcing the standards established in this
chapter on behalf of individuals with disabilities; and (4) to
invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the
power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate
commerce, in order to address the major areas of
discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.
Id.
40 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). Section 12182(a) provides in pertinent part: "No
individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full
and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages,
or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who
owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation." Id.41 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
810 [Vol 15
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centers around the right of Ms. Abbott to sue Dr. Bragdon as his
dental practice is considered a place of "public accommodation"
42
Furthermore, in the early 1990s there was a limited amount of
case law on the newly passed ADA.43 Because of this limitation
and the practically identical construction and language, the
standards and regulations of the Rehabilitation Act, except where
explicitly different, were held to apply to the ADA.'4
B. Judicial Application
This note reviews the judicial application of the ADA related to
two issues'5 decided by the Supreme Court in the Bragdon case.
The lower courts applied these issues in two separate contexts -
employment& and public accommodations.47 Both are significant
because they lay the groundwork for the jurisdictional splits
42 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Section 12181(7) provides in pertinent part: "The
following private entities are considered public accommodations for purposes
of this subchapter, if the operations of such entities affect commerce .... (F).
... professional office of a health care provider ..... " Id.
43 Erickson v. Board of Govemers, 911 F. Supp. 316, 322 (N.D. 11. 1995).
44 United States v. Morvant, 898 F. Supp. 1157, 1160 (E.D. La. 1995).
45 Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998). The first issue "whether
reproduction is a major life activity within the meaning of the ADA" was
applied in the context of the workplace in the lower courts. See Zatarain v.
WDSU-Television, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 240 (E.D. La. 1995), aff'd, 79 F.3d
1143 (5th Cir. 1996); Erickson, 911 F. Supp. 316; Pacourek v. Inland Steel,
916 F. Supp. 797 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Krauel v. Iowa Medical Center, 95 F.3d
674 (8th Cir. 1996). The second issue "whether asymptomatic individuals
infected with HIV are per se disabled within the meaning of the ADA" was
applied in the lower courts both as a workplace discrimination and public
accommodation discrimination issue. See Morvant, 898 F. Supp. 1157;
Runnebaum v. Nationsbank, 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 1997). See alsoSchool
Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
1 See Katz v. City Metal Co. Inc., 87 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 1996); Krauel, 95
F.3d 674; Pacourek, 916 F. Supp. 797; Hernandez v. Prudential Insurance
Co. of America, 977 F. Supp. 1160 (M.D. Fla. 1997); Ennis v. NABER, 53
F.3d 55 (4th Cir. 1995); Erickson, 911 F. Supp. 316; Runnebaum v.
Nationsbank, 123 F. 156 (4th Cir. 1997).
'4 See Morvant, 898 F. Supp. 1157; Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934 (1st
Cir. 1996).
1999
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resolved by the Bragdon Court.4 8 In both contexts, the burden of
proof lies with the plaintiff to prove a "disability" within the
meaning of the ADA.49  In the case of employment
discrimination, the plaintiff must also prove that with or without
"reasonable accommodation"50 the plaintiff was able to perform
the essential functions of the job and that the employer discharged
the plaintiff in whole or in part because of the disability. 5'
Furthermore, when a case relates to discrimination in a place of
"public accommodation,, 52 there are two additional requirements
for a plaintiff to prove.53 First, plaintiff must show that the
alleged facility, office, etc. is a place of "public
accommodation. ,14 Second, plaintiff must prove denial of full
and equal treatment, services, etc. because of the "disability." 5'
Both the Act and the ADA define "disability" as "a physical or
mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of the
major life activities of [an] individual." 5 6
C. Dissent in the Legal Community
Whether an HIV positive individual is covered by the ADA and
protected from discrimination depends on whether the condition
" Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
49 See Katz, 87 F.3d at 30; Morvant, 898 F. Supp. at 1161.
50 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (1994). Section 12111(9) provides in pertinent part:
The term "reasonable accommodation" may include --(A)
making existing facilities used by employees readily
accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules,
reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification
of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or
modifications of examinations, training materials or policies,
the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other
similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.
Id.
51 Katz, 87 F.3d at 30.
52 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
53Morvant, 898 F. Supp. at 1161.
5 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
5sMorvant, 898 F. Supp. at 1161.
56 See supra note 6.
812 [Vol 15
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is covered within the definition of "physical impairment,"' 7 as
well as if that "physical impairment"" affects a "major life
activity" . In Bragdon, the Court granted certiorari to determine
whether an individual with asymptomatic HIV was per se
disabled under the ADA. 6°
When HIV has produced visible symptoms affecting one or
more body systems, the condition fits squarely within the
definition of "physical impairment" as defined by the DHHS6' or
the definition of "substantially limits" as defined by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission [hereinafter "EEOC"].62
Yet, when the individual is HIV positive and asymptomatic, the
clarity is lost.
Without definitional clarity, individuals must rely on a court's
interpretation of the definition in order to determine if the law
provides protection. Because a determination of disability is
made on a case by case basis,' it is necessary to analyze cases
where the plaintiff was HIV positive and asymptomatic in order
to have the proper context to understand the Bragdon decision.
In the 1995 decision of Ennis v. NABERj the Fourth Circuit
court assumed "disability" for an asymptomatic HIV infected
individual for the purposes of the litigation." Yet, in the 1997
decision'of Runnebaun v. Nationsbank,6 the Fourth Circuit held
that an individual with asymptomatic HIV would not be
considered to have a disability under the ADA.67
57 See supra note 31.
58 See id.
s See supra note 32.
o Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2207 (1997) (declining to address
whether HIV infection is a per se disability).
61 See supra note 31.
6 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20) (1998). Section 1630.20) provides in pertinent
part: "[I]mpairments, however, such as HIV infection, are inherently
substantially limiting." Id.
6 Ennis v. NABER, 53 F.3d 55 (4th Cir. 1995).
64 id.
6 Id. at 60.
6 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 1997).
6Id. at 161.
1999
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These cases are distinguished by their analysis of the HIV
infected individual as "disabled." In Ennis, the court assumed,
without analysis, that plaintiff's adopted son was disabled within
the meaning of the ADA,68 while also holding that she did not
carry her burden to prove a prima facie case of disability. 69 Yet,
in Runnebaum the court held that asymptomatic HIV did not
qualify as a disability under the ADA scheme.70 In order to
dispose of the case in Ennis, the court did not need to analyze
HIV as a "disability". However, in order to make a
determination in Runnebaum, analysis of whether or not HIV is a
"disability" was necessary for the outcome of the case.7
Other circuit courts have held that HIV is a "disability" under
the ADA. In the 1994 case of Gates v. Rowland,72 the Ninth
Circuit concluded that an individual with HIV infection was
"disabled" under the ADA.73 The First Circuit held that an
individual infected with HIV was per se disabled under the
ADA7 4. The First Circuit relied on the specific language of the
EEOC regulation75 whereby "HIV disease (whether symptomatic
or asymptomatic)" was considered within a long list of physical
and mental impairments.76 Lastly, the Eleventh Circuit also held
that HIV positive individuals were disabled within the meaning of
the Rehabilitation Act as they are "regarded as having a physical
impairment. "77
Ennis, 53 F.3d at 60.
69 Ennis, 53 F.3d at 62.
70 Runnebaum, 123 F.3d 156.
71 Id. at 165-70.
72 39 F.3d 1439 (9th Cir. 1994).
73 Id. at 1446.
7' Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d. 934, 939 (1st Cir. 1997).
7' 28 C.F.R. § 35.104(B)(ii) (1998). Section 35.104(B)(ii) provides in
pertinent part: "The phrase physical or mental impairment includes, but is not
limited to, such contagious and noncontagious diseases and conditions as ...
.HIV disease (whether symptomatic or asymptomatic). ... " Id.
76 Id.
' Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1524 (1991). The court noted that the
Supreme Court in Arline had not decided whether those with asymptomatic
diseases were considered to be physically impaired within the meaning of the
statute. Id. at 1523. Additionally, as noted abovethe regulations and case law
[Vol 15
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Federal district courts have also decided that asymptomatic HIV
positive individuals are disabled within the meaning of the ADA.
The court in T.E.P. v. Leavitt, ' held that those infected with HIV
were disabled within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973. 79 In 1995, the court deciding United States v. Morvantz
relied on a Department of Justice regulation8' and held that
asymptomatic HIV disease was a disability under the ADA.'
Similarly, when the court decided Howard v. Hull, S"it concluded
that both AIDS and HIV infection were disabilities under the
ADA.84
A finding that asymptomatic HIV is a "physical impairment"
under the ADA does not carry the burden of showing that
asymptomatic HIV is a "disability." Whether or not a "physical
... impairment substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities"8 determines if the ADA protects those with
asymptomatic HIV. 6 Herein lies another jurisdictional split;
under the Rehabilitation Act were largely adopted with the passage of the
ADA. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. See also Doe v. Garrett.
903 F.2d 1455, 1459 (11th Cir. 1990) (noting that "infection with AIDS
constitutes a handicap for the purposes of the Act.").
7 840 F. Supp. 110 (D. Utah 1993).
71 Id. at 110.
'o 898 F. Supp. 1157 (E.D. La. 1995).
1' 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1998). Section 36.104 provides in pertinent part:
Disability means .... (iii) [t]he phrase physical or mental
impairment includes, but is not limited to, such contagious
and noncontagious diseases and conditions as orthopedic,
visual, speech, and hearing impairments, cerebral palsy,
epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, cancer,
heart disease, diabetes, mental retardation, emotional illness,
specific learning disabilities, HIV disease (whether
symptomatic or asymptomatic), tuberculosis, drug addiction,
and alcoholism.
Id.
8 Morvant, 898 F. Supp. at 1161.
1 873 F. Supp. 72 (N.D. Ohio 1994).
84 Id. at 78.
81 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
86 id.
1999 815
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namely, whether reproduction is considered a "major life
activity.,81
Bragdon involves a respondent who claimed that the risk of
infecting her sexual partners and offspring substantially limited
her ability to reproduce.8 . The First Circuit court cites Stanley v.
lllinois8 9 in finding that Congress likely intended for reproduction
to be considered a "major life activity" when it promulgated the
ADA. 9°  Similarly, the federal district court in the Eastern
Division of Pennsylvania relied on Stanley v. Illinois when it
found that the risk of transmission to offspring was a "significant
injury to the reproductive system [and] impe[ded] a major life
activity."91 The federal district court in the Middle Division of
Florida found there was sufficient evidence in the record to
permit a jury to find that the HIV positive plaintiff was
"substantially limited" in the "major life activity" of
reproduction.' This same court also found that the plaintiff was
"substantially limited" in his ability to care for himself, which is
a "major life activity" from the list illustrated by the EEOC. 9'
87 See Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 939 (1st Cir. 1997) (deducing that
the drafters of the ADA considered reproduction to be a major life activity);
see also Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 916 F. Supp. 797, 804 (N.D. I1l. 1996)
(finding that reproduction was a major life activity); Erickson v. Board of
Governors of State Colleges, 911 F. Supp. 316, 323 (N.D. I11. 1995) (finding
that reproduction was a major life activity); Cain v. Hyatt, 734 F. Supp. 671,
679 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (finding that reproduction was a major life activity). But
see Krauel v. Iowa Medical Center, 95 F.3d 674, 677 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding
that reproduction was not a major life activity); Zatarain v. WDSU-Television,
Inc., 881 F. Supp. 240, 243 (E.D. La. 1995) (holding that reproduction was
not a major life activity).
88Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2204.
89 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). This case elucidates the
importance in American jurisprudence of family and related matters through a
litany of case illustrations.
90 Abbott, 107 F.3d at 939.
91 Hyatt, 734 F. Supp. at 679.
9 Hernandez v. Prudential, 977 F. Supp. 1160, 1164 (M.D. Fla. 1997).
9 Id at 1165. The plaintiff in this case was not asymptomatic during the time
of the alleged discrimination. Id. at 1165. He suffered from a variety of
symptoms related to his HIV infection. Id. See also supra note 31.
816 [Vol 15
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In 1996, the Federal district court in the Eastern District of
Illinois held that reproduction was a "major life activity" as it
related to the reproductive disorder of infertility94. Within the
context of infertility, there was jurisdictional dissension as to
whether reproduction could suffice for the "major life activity"
prong of a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA. 9
The federal district court in the Eastern District of Louisiana
held that infertility could not meet both the "physical
impairment" prong and the "major life activity" prong of a claim
of disability under the ADA.9 The court found that infertility is
clearly a physical impairment that affects the reproductive
system,' one of the specified body systems listed by the EEOC.'
However, the use of this same body system to meet the "major
life activity" element of proof was deemed to be the plaintiff's
attempt to "bootstrap a finding of substantial limitation of a major
life activity on to a finding of substantial impairment. " "
Furthermore, the court reasoned that reproduction is not an
activity consistent with the list of activities enumerated by the
EEOC °° because it was not engaged in with the same degree of
regularity as those in the EEOC list.' 0'
The EEOC list focuses on those activities of daily living which
are typically engaged in on a daily basis.' 02  To allow
reproduction to be included in this list, reasoned the court, would
be to expand the meaning of the ADA which is beyond the
I Pacourek v. Inland Steel, 916 F. Supp. 797, 801 (E.D. 111. 1996).
95 See Pacourek, 916 F. Supp. 797 (E.D. Ill. 1996) (finding that
reproduction was a major life activity); Erickson v. Board of Governers, 911
F. Supp. 316 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (finding that reproduction was a major life
activity); Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 240 (E.D. La.
1995), af0'd, 79 F.3d 1143 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that reproduction was not
a major life activity); Krauel v. IMMC, 95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding
that reproduction was not a major life activity).
95 Zatarain, 881 F. Supp. at 243.
9 Id.
11 See supra note 31.
9Zatarain, 881 F. Supp. at 243.
110 See supra note 32.
101 Zatarain, 881 F. Supp. at 243.
102 Id.
1999 817
13
Guidry: Bragdon v. Abbott
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1999
TOURO LAWREVIEW
jurisdiction of the judiciary." 3 The Eighth Circuit followed the
Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc. court when it found that
treating reproduction as a major life activity would be to "stretch
the federal law."14
Conversely, the United States district court in the Eastern
District of Illinois disputed this reasoning and held that
reproduction is a major life activity.0 5 The court in Erickson v.
Board of Governers'06 specifically disputed the Zatarain court's
reasoning in finding that reproduction is an activity that one
engages in with the same degree of frequency as the other listed
activities. 07  In so finding, the court simply identified that
reproduction is a broader process than conception and
gestation. 0 8 For both men and women, the reproductive systems
are continually engaging in processes to achieve conception. "
Similarly, the court in Pacourek v. Inland Steel"0 identified that
holding reproduction as a major life activity was clearly
consistent with the intention of the ADA."'1 The court based its
holding on the inclusion of "reproduction" in the illustrated list of
body systems for "physical impairment."'1 The court found that
the main purpose of the reproductive system is procreation;
therefore, to not also find reproduction as a major life activity is
to make the inclusion of this system in the list moot. 113
It is important to note that the contextual framework for each
ADA claim may influence the reasoning of the court. The four
cases cited above show dissent in the judiciary when reproduction
is identified as a "major life activity" as it relates to infertility.
103 id.
104 Krauel v. IMMC, 95 F.3d. 674, 677 (8th 1996).
'05 See Pacourek v. Inland Steel, 916 F. Supp. 797 (E.D. Ill. 1996);
Erickson v. Board of Governers, 911 F. Supp. 316 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
0911 F. Supp. 316 (N.D. Ill. 1995)
107 Id. at 322.
108 Id.
109Id.
10 916 F. Supp. 797 (E.D. Ili. 1996)
" Id. at 801.
112 Id.
113 Id. But see Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2215 (1998) (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting).
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The Bragdon case, however, focuses on reproduction as an
impaired "major life activity" as it relates to the potential
transmission of HIV to both partner and unborn child.
The Zatarain court struggles to allow the use of reproduction as
a "major life activity" because of the use of the same body
system for the "physical impairment" prong of the prima facie
case. Yet, the Runnebaurn court also disputes the use of
reproduction as a "major life activity" within the context of HIV
related concerns.114  This court reasons, that one infected with
HIV can, in fact, reproduce."' 5 This court finds that the choice to
forego the risk of infection to an unborn child is unpersuasive as
a substantial limitation to the "major life activity" of
reproduction."1 6
The third issue for which the Supreme Court granted certiorari
relates to the degree of deference given to a health care
professional's judgment when making decisions related to
invasive procedures on infectious patients." 7 The First Circuit in
Abbott v. Bragdon decided that the relevant medical knowledge at
the time of the dentist's decision did not support the dentist's
argument of a "direct threat.""' In a similar case, the Fifth
Circuit held that a dentist who was referring all HIV positive
patients to another dentist under the guise of a specialty referral,
was in violation of the ADA. 19 The court found that the infected
patients could have been treated in his office with the use of the
same level of precaution given to non-infected patients without a
direct threat to the dentist or his staff." It is precisely this type
of discrimination that the Act and ADA were passed to address. 12,
"
4Runnebaum, 123 F.3d 156, 171 (4th Cir. 1997).
115 Id.
"
6 Id. See also Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2216 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
17 Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2210.
118 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3) (1994). § 12111(3) provides in pertinent part:
"The term "direct threat" means a significant risk to the health or safety of
others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation." Id.
19 United States v. Morvant, 898 F. Supp. 1157, 1161 (E.D. La. 1995).
120 Id.
121 Cain v. Hyatt, 734 F. Supp. 671, 682 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
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III. THE DECISION
The Bragdon case was decided on June 25, 1998.2 The
Court handed down a 5-4decision holding that Ms. Abbott's HIV
infection did constitute a disability under the ADA. 123 All three
underlying issues supporting a claim of disability were decided:
1) whether her HIV infection was a "physical impairment," 2)
whether reproduction and child bearing constitute a "major life
activity," and 3) if the impairment "substantially limits" the
"major life activity."' 24  However, the Court remanded to the
First Circuit the degree of deference given to the health care
provider in determining if a "direct threat" exists.125
Relative to the first underlying issue, the Court held that HIV is
an "impairment from the moment of infection." 126 Specifically,
the Court finds the use of the term "asymptomatic" a misnomer 27
when referencing that one is infected but not visibly affected by
HIV. The Court illustrated at great length the current scientific
knowledge supporting its decision. 128 This decision resolves one
of the Circuit splits.
The second underlying issue also involved a jurisdictional split;
whether reproduction is to be considered a "major life activity."
The Court easily finds that reproduction is a major life activity. 129
Support for the Courts decision is predicated on the definition of
the term "major " "o as well as an interpretation of the list from
the Rehabilitation Act as "illustrative, not exhaustive."''
However, the Court goes even further in stating that
"reproduction and the sexual dynamics surrounding it are central
"2 Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
2MId. at 2201.
124 Id. at 2202.
125Id. at 2213.
126Id. at 2204.
127 id.
i" Id. at 2203-04.
129 Id. at 2205.
130 id.
131 Id.
[Vol 15820
16
Touro Law Review, Vol. 15 [1999], No. 2, Art. 22
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol15/iss2/22
BRAGDON V ABBOTT
to the life process itself."' 32 The case before the Court and other
similar cases, did not rely on HIV affecting one's sexual relations
as a "major life activity." 133
The third underlying issue brings the two prior issues together
in deciding if the "physical impairment" of HIV infection
substantially limits one's ability to reproduce. The Court held
that "a consistent course of agency interpretation
consider[ing] the issue. . . found statutory coverage for persons
with asymptomatic HIV.' 3 Again, the Court identifies the risk
of infection during sexual activity as part of the "substantial
limitation" analysis. 35  The risk of perinatal infection is also
identified in the same analysis as a "substantial limitation." 136
The dissent argues that those infected with HIV are able to
engage in sexual relations, get pregnant, carry the pregnancy to
term and give birth. 37  This ability does not constitute a
"substantial limitation" on life activities, according to the dissent,
but a choice which is to be considered a voluntary act.' The
Court specifically disputes the logic of the dissent in finding that
just because an HIV infected woman can become pregnant and
carry the fetus to term, does not necessarily mean that her risk of
infecting her offspring does not substantially limit this activity. 39
This decision resolved a second jurisdictional split whether
reproduction could suffice as a "major life activity" to prove a
disability and state a claim under the ADA.
In coming to these conclusions, the Court relied heavily on a
variety of agency interpretations related to the issue of HIV and
its effects on reproduction."4° Of particular interest is a statement
from the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice
13 id.
133 See Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 939 (1st Cir. 1997); Runnebaumn v.
Nationsbank, 123 F.3d 156, 171 (4th Cir. 1997).
'34 Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2207.
3 Id. at 2206.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 2216 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting)
138 id.
139 id.
140 Id.
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that "the life activity of engaging in sexual relations is threatened
and probably substantially limited by the contagiousness of the
virus. ")141
Having decided that Ms. Abbott was disabled under the ADA,
the Court declined to decide if HIV infection was a per se
disability. 1
42
The last major issue before the Court questioned the
appropriate degree of deference to be given to the health care
provider's professional judgment. Specifically, the Court granted
certiorari to determine whether the courts should defer to the
health care professional's judgment as long as it is reasonable in
light of then current medical knowledge. 
1 43
The existence of a significant risk is determined from the point
of view of the health care professional; however, the view must
be based on an assessment of the risk based on "medical or other
objective evidence." 144 The intent of this standard is to protect
the disabled from prejudice while also protecting health care
professionals from significant risk. 145  And thereby, the health
care professional is not free to determine for him or herself that a
significant risk exists without basing that determination on
objective medical evidence. The Court stated that "an individual
physician's state of mind could [not] excuse discrimination
without regard to the objective reasonableness of his actions." 146
The "direct threat1 47 language is a codification of the Supreme
Court's decision in School Board v. Arline.' 48  In Arline, a
141 Id. at 2207.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 2209.
144d. at 2210.
145 Id. See also School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273,
287 (1987).
146 Id. at 2210.
147 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3) (1994). Section 12182(b)(3) provides in
pertinent part:
Nothing in this subchapter shall require an entity to permit an
individual to participate in or benefit from the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages and
accommodations of such entity where such individual poses a
direct threat to the health or safety of others. The term
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school teacher was fired from her job after suffering her third
tuberculosis relapse within a two year period. 9 Gene Arline,
respondent, sued the School Board alleging that her firing
violated § 504150 of the Rehabilitation Act.' 5' The Court agreed
with respondent that her condition met the statutory definition of
"handicapped individual." 152 However, petitioners conceded that
her tuberculosis met the statutory definition due to her "having a
record of physical impairment"' 53 based on her numerous
hospitalizations." Petitioner argued that respondent was fired
because of the threat her tuberculosis posed on the health of
others. 5
The Court was clear to ensure that contagious diseases were
covered by the Act. 56 In fact, there is considerable discussion by
the Court regarding the necessity of providing coverage for those
with contagious diseases due to the level of fear associated with
these diseases in the general public." It is precisely this type of
fear that results in discrimination which the ADA seeks to
combat. Therefore, those with contagious diseases are covered
by both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA.
Yet, what both Arline and Bragdon questioned was the limit of
the protection afforded to individuals whose disabilities pose a
"direct threat" means a significant risk to the health or safety
of others that cannot be eliminated by a modification of
policies, practices, or procedures or by the provision of
auxiliary aids or services.
Id.
4 Arline, 480 U.S. at 273. See also Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2210.
149 Arline, 480 U.S. at 276.
150 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994) (amending 87 Stat. 394).
5 Arline, 480 U.S. at 276.
152 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B) (1994). Section 705(20)(B) provides in pertinent
part: "(A)ny person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which
substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities; (ii) has a
record of such impairment; or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment."
Id.
153 See id.
" Arline, 480 U.S. at 281.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 282-86.
1h Id. at 284 n. 12.
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threat to others. Where Arline required the Court determine if
Mrs. Arline was "otherwise qualified"' 58  for the job of
elementary schoolteacher,' 59  Bragdon required the Court
determine if Ms. Abbott posed a "direct threat" to Dr.
Bragdon.'6
The Arline Court identified a two-pronged analysis for deciding
if the individual is "otherwise qualified."' 16' First, is an inquiry
into the findings based on reasonable medical judgements given
the state of medical knowledge, about (a) the nature of the risk
(how the disease is transmitted), (b) the duration of the risk (how
long the carrier is infectious), (c) the severity of the risk (what is
the potential harm to third parties) and (d) the probabilities the
disease will be transmitted and will cause varying degrees of
harm.162 Second, is an inquiry into whether or not the employer
could reasonably accommodate the employee in light of the
medical findings.' 63 The Arline Court remanded for further
findings of fact."
On remand to the United States District Court in the Middle
District of Florida, the court concluded that Mrs. Arline was
"otherwise qualified" to teach in 1978 and was "otherwise
qualified" at the time of the decision. 65 The Bragdon Court also
remanded the "direct threat" issue to the lower court. 166 In
remanding the case, the Court identified that the weight
previously given by the lower court to certain components of
medical evidence did not assess the level of the risk required by
the statute. 167 This risk assessment is necessary to determine if
158 Id. at 287.
159 id.
" Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2200.
161 Arline, 480 U.S. at 288.
162 Id.
163 id.
'64 Id. at 289.
165 Arline v. School Board of Nassau County, 692 F. Supp. 1286 (M.D. Fla.
1988).
66Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2213 (1998).
167 Id. at 2211 (expressing concern that the CDC guidelines which
recommend universal precautions as a means of combating the risk of HIV,
did not assess the level of the risk.)
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any risk posed is "significant" and if so, if it could be
"eliminated by a modification of policies, practices, or
procedures. .. ,16 Additionally, the Court leaves open the
possibility that the health care professional who determines that a
significant risk is present can disagree with the prevailing medical
consensus on the subject."6 9 And, if the health care professional
does in fact disagree, the prevailing medical consensus can be
"refute(d) by citing a credible scientific basis for deviating from
the accepted norm."170 There are both similarities and differences
in these two cases. The similarities are that both plaintiffs
suffered from contagious diseases. Also, both suffered
discriminatory conduct from others based on their diseases.
What is different is that one plaintiff sued for workplace
discrimination while the other sued for discriminatory treatment
in a place of public accommodation. Also, where Ms. Arline
allegedly presented a threat to school children, Ms. Abbott's
potential threat was to a health care worker.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is clear that the Bragdon Court resolved a number of issues
that were previously disputed in the lower courts. Asymptomatic
HIV is now defined as a "disability" and protected by the
ADA.' Additionally, reproduction is to be considered a "major
life activity" under the statutory framework of the ADA. 7 Yet,
these decisions do not completely resolve the question of who is
protected by the ADA; in fact, this decision opens the door to
additional questions of who is protected by the legislation.
The Court's language in determining that reproduction is to be
considered a "major life activity" brings into play, not just
16' Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2214.
169 Id. at 2211.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 2204.
172 Id. at 2205.
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reproduction, but the "sexual dynamics surrounding it ....
This reference to sexual relations was mentioned several times.'74
The Court initially discussed sexual relations in the "major life
activity" analysis. 175  Although the Court mentioned "sexual
dynamics surrounding [reproduction] as central to the life process
itself," the "sexual dynamics" portion of the quote was not
elaborated upon. 176 It is unclear if the Court intended to extend
the definition of "major life activity" to sexual relations and
thereby include this as a protected category under the ADA.
Additionally, since respondent asserted only that she was affected
in the "major life activity" of reproduction not sexual relations
per se, it was additionally unclear if the Court's use of this
language was dicta.
A second mention of sexual behavior in the opinion was in the
context of the analysis of whether the "physical impairment was a
substantial limit on the major life activity."177 Again, since the
respondent in this case only presented the issue of the risk of
infecting her child during pregnancy,178 it is unclear whether the
language discussing sexual dynamics is dicta or law.
It remains to be seen whether the Court will find that an HIV
positive individual is protected by the ADA when there is no
desire to reproduce, but the individuals HIV infection
substantially limits sexual activity. Moreover, the Bragdon case
context for the "sexual dynamic" and infection risk language
relates to sexual relations which are engaged in, in order to
procreate. 179 What about a couple engaging in sexual relations
with no desire to procreate, who in fact utilize condoms for the
dual purpose of birth control and reduction of HIV transmission?
173 Id.
17 Id. (holding that "Reproduction and the sexual dynamics surrounding it
are central to the life process itself."). Id. at 2206 (holding that "First, a
woman infected with HIV who tries to conceive a child imposes on the man a
significant risk of becoming infected.").
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 2206.
178 Id. at 2204.
179 Id.
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Is this couple protected? Taking the analogy further, are
homosexual male and female couples protected by the ADA when
their sexual relations could never be characterized as an attempt
to procreate?
These are a few of the many questions relating to the
"disability" definition which were left unanswered in the Bragdon
decision. Certainly, the lower courts will grapple with the
language and effects of Bragdon and delineate many of these
unanswered questions.
Where the issues decided leave many questions unanswered,
the remanded issue opens the door to an incredibly broader array
of concerns for those infected with HIV. The Court concluded
that the evidence before it was insufficient to determine if Dr.
Bragdon supported his contention that a "direct threat" existed. '
Therefore, the issue was remanded to the lower court for
determination of whether the Supreme Courts analysis of some of
the studies presented a triable issue of fact on the question of
risk.181 In fact, the remand decision proved to show the greatest
level of consistency in the opinion with the support of seven
justices and two dissenters. 8  However, as Justice Stevens noted
in his concurrence, the reasons underlying the remand decision
are not consistent.18
The threat of infection with an incurable disease would likely
be frightening to most people. Because of this fear, individuals
infected with an incurable disease potentially run a high risk of
discrimination by healthcare professionals laboring under their
own fear of infection. However, because of the existence of the
disease state, infected individuals are in need of health care and
are thereby likely to come in contact with their healthcare
providers fears. Since discrimination is not always obvious and
can in fact be insidious; the threat exists that individuals with
180 Id. at 2213.
181 Id.
11 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, Scalia,
Thomas and O'Connor supported remand while Justices Stevens and Breyer
supported an outright affirmance. Id. at 2196.
11 Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2213 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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HIV will be discriminated against when their providers fear
infection.
A potential threat to the HIV infected patient lies in the
language of the majority opinion, "[a] health care professional
who disagrees with the prevailing medical consensus may refute it
by citing a credible scientific basis for deviating from the
accepted norm."'84 Here, the Court identifies the freedom of the
health care professional to disagree with an accepted norm if that
professional relies on credible science. However, this does open
up the possibility of supporting the fear of health care workers to
discriminate in ways the law is meant to protect. A health care
worker might fear HIV infection and thereby engage in overly
broad restrictive practices. These practices could subject the HIV
patient to additional costs or encumbrances in receipt of their
health care. These practices might not be considered
discrimination if that health care worker could cite a "credible"
source supporting their use. This would be so despite the
prevailing medical view. In this scenario the health care
professional would be free to dress up prejudice in clinical or
medical terms in order to succeed in breaking the spirit of the
law. Although this might seem a bit hyperbolic considering the
legal standard implied in the statute; 8' not all cases of
discrimination are litigated.
The language in Arline recognizes the concerns of fear based
decision making.'86 "Few aspects of a handicap give rise to the
same level of public fear and misapprehension as
contagiousness." '187 Responding to it's own recognition of this,
184 Id. at 2211 (citing W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen,
Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts § 32, p. 187 (5th ed. 1984)).
185 See supra note 9.
186 School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987).
187Id. See also Arline, 480 U.S. at 286 n.12. "The isolation of the
chronically ill or contagious appears across cultures and centuries, as does the
development of complex and often pernicious mythologies about the nature,
cause, and transmission of illness." Id. "Senator Humphrey noted the
'irrational fears or prejudice on the part of employers or fellow workers' that
make it difficult for former cancer patients to secure employment." Id. at 286
n.13.
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the Court states "[t]he Act is carefully structured to replace such
reflexive reactions to actual or perceived handicaps with actions
based on reasoned and medically sound judgments .... " 1 Does
the language in Bragdon fully realize this possibility when
allowing the health care professional to rely on sources outside of
the mainstream of accepted medical practice? ' Under this line of
reasoning, could not a health care provider discriminate against
those infected with HIV based on that health care workers fear of
infection if the fear had some basis in science, even though this
basis was not widely accepted? It seems that this is just what Dr.Bragdon was doing in this instance.'1 Dr. Bragdon based a
policy of filling cavities in HIV infected patients in hospital
settings on the fear that he might be infected if the virus became
airborne during the procedure. 191 This fear was seemingly based
or supported by a study revealing that "the use of high speed
drills and surface cooling water created a risk of airborne HIV
transmission."'2 The particular study on which respondent relied
was deemed inconclusive by the Court, 93 and would therefore not
be likely to provide the necessary scientific basis required. ',
Nevertheless, Dr. Bragdon engaged in the discriminatory practice
apparently believing the science he relied upon was "credible".
The Court identifies the health care provider's duty as
"assess[ing] the risk of infection based on the objective, scientific
information available to him and others in his profession."
18 8 Id.
189 This does not preclude this writers understanding that a basis outside of
the mainstream of medical evidence must also be "credible" medical evidence.
As well as the certainty of this writer that health care providers should have
the ability to rely on state of the art medical technology and research that may
have yet to make it into the 'mainstream' of medical practice. This is only to
recognize the perspective of the patient who could find the health care worker
supported in discriminatory practices.
1' Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2201 (1998).
'9' Id. at 2212.
19 Id.
193 Id.
19 Id. at 2210. See also School Board or Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S.
273, 288 (1987.
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(emphasis added)'95 The problem with the language of this duty is
that fear is a subjective, emotional response. Although the
evidence may be objectively based, it is seen through the eyes of
a subjective, potentially highly charged emotional response.
Therefore, a health care provider with a heightened fear of HIV
infection might evaluate a study and determine a significant risk
exists; where another health care professional with little or no
fear of infection may determine that only a limited risk exists.
However the final issue is determined in the Court of
Appeals,196 several jurisdictional splits were resolved by this
decision. Although HIV infection is not necessarily a per se
disability, it is clear that asymptomatic HIV infection is a
"physical disability." It is also clear that reproduction is
considered a "major life activity" which is substantially limited
by the existence if the HIV virus in the body. It remains to be
seen if the Court will recognize HIV positive individuals who
have no desire to procreate as also protected by the ADA because
of the substantial effect of the disease on their sexual activities. It
also remains to be seen how much protection will be afforded to
those individuals with infectious diseases in their pursuit of health
care.
Leah Guidry*
95Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2210.
196 The case on remand was decided on December 29, 1998. Abbott v.
Bragdon, No. 96-1643, 1998 WL 887125 (lst Cir.). Upon review, the First
Circuit reaffirmed the district court's summary judgement decision. Id. at 1.
* I dedicate this first published work to my father who imbued me with an
unquenchable thirst for knowledge. Early in my life, he taught me that
"knowledge for the sake of knowledge" is a worthy and respectable pursuit.
A special note of thanks to Professor Jack Battaglia whose direct feedback
and hours of consultation elevated this work to a different level.
Thank you to the Editors and staff of the Touro Law Review for their
training and attention to details.
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